We model the interactions among innovation, financing and product market competition. We provide closed form solutions for the values of competing firms in the context of a dynamic duopoly, in which one competitor faces an opportunity to adopt a new technology. If adopted, the firm must also determine whether it will obtain public or private financing. Our results allow us to relate current firm and industry characteristics to these decision variables. In particular, larger, more profitable firms with small rivals have greatest incentives to innovate. The private versus public financing decision depends mainly on the magnitude of the technological improvement and length of the period during which private financing extends the innovator's product market advantage.
2 in financing decisions is an empirical question, and an important advantage of this paper is that it generates numerous testable hypotheses that can easily be matched with available data. Directly testable dynamic models are relatively rare in the capital structure literature although Leland (1994) , Leland (1998) , Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) are notable exceptions. 2 Potential issuers face a tradeoff between releasing information and the promised return when deciding between a public or private financing. Public issuance in the United States involves the release of information that is potentially valuable to competitors and thus may hurt the future product market performance of the issuer.
3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (notably, Section 409) also mandates "real-time" disclosure of material information, which implies significant post-issuance disclosure. On the other hand, private financing involves a limited number of investors who may require higher returns due to, for example, the relative illiquidity of their investment. Indeed, there is a well documented discount for private securities (see e.g., Hertzel and Smith (1993) for an analysis of private placements).
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To address these issues, we solve a differential game based upon a variant of the Lanchester (1916) "battle" model. In our application two firms compete against each other for market share by spending funds to acquire each others customers. The adaptation we develop 3 provides a simple, yet flexible structure for examining the dynamic interactions among product market competition, innovation and public versus private financing.
In the model, one firm has an opportunity to invest in a new value enhancing technology.
Assuming the firm decides to innovate it then chooses between financing development costs with public or privately placed securities. The main benefit of private financing is that it allows the firm to extend the time during which it can hide its technological progress. This in turn extends the time it retains its competitive advantage over its rival which eventually catches up.
5
The model's duopoly setting allows it to produce predictions regarding the competitive environment's impact on innovation and financing decisions; insights that are obviously impossible to derive in a single firm model. For example, the paper shows that increasing a rival's ability to attract customers can encourage innovators to use public financing. Many other questions like these can be addressed as well. Also, note that actions by one firm in an industry have value implications for its rivals. Thus, the model also provides testable predictions regarding the impact of technological innovations and financing decisions by one firm on the value of another.
Our results also indicate that the relative size of the firms in an industry can play an important role in the innovation decision. In particular, larger, more profitable firms with small rivals have the greatest incentives to innovate. Intuitively, this is because small, less profitable firms are less able to withstand the aggressive competitive behavior by rivals that their own innovation triggers. The positive relationship between firm size and the number of innovations predicted by the model has been documented empirically (see e.g., Acs and Audretsch (1988) , Henderson and Cockburn (1996) , and Nahm (2001)).
5 Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) also model the advantage of privately placed securities as reducing the information available to competitors.
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Two extensions to the model examine how the innovation and financing decisions vary with the type of innovation. In the first, both firms have simultaneous access to a technology that, if adopted at some cost, will improve their ability to draw customers from their rival but does not increase industry demand (e.g. an improved washing machine). Alternatively, the firms can wait and adopt the technology at a reduced or no additional cost (for example when a manufacturing plant needs to be replaced). 6 If the parameters are such that both firms decide to immediately adopt the new technology then both firms see their values fall. This happens because the firms spend resources to bring the technology on line, but given that both adopt it there are in net no competitive benefits. However, even if only one firm initially adopts the new technology there remain parameters under which both firms see their values decline. These results derive directly from the competitive environment and would be difficult to mimic in a single firm setting.
The second extension examines a setting in which the currently private firm can secretly innovate in a way that its profits increase per unit sold. Such innovations can end up increasing the amount both firms in the industry spend to acquire market share. Of course, both would prefer to spend less, but cannot credibly commit to doing so in the full information game. We consider a pooling equilibrium in which the innovating firm secures private financing and chooses the equilibrium spending of a less profitable firm (i.e., firm without the new technology). Here, private financing allows this technologically superior firm to spend less on acquiring market share. This in turn reduces the rival's market share spending leading to overall increased instantaneous earnings. Note, counter intuitively, it pays for the rival to adopt a "hear no evil, see no evil" strategy since finding out the truth would actually reduce its profits. 6 Here public financing is always chosen by early adopters since the innovation is common knowledge.
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Within the existing literature the paper that comes closest to this one is Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) . They examine the public-private financing decision within an industry that produces a homogenous good over two periods and for which there is costly entry and exit. In contrast, this paper examines a duopoly competing in a heterogenous goods industry over an infinite horizon. Other contrasts between the papers are discussed later on in the text.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the basic model. Section II examines the solution in the infinite horizon case. Section III looks at the case where a firm can gain a competitive advantage for a finite time via an innovation that improves its ability to attract customers. Section IV discusses the conditions that make private financing desirable. Section V considers two extensions to the model: In one both firms have an opportunity to adopt an innovation, in the other just one. Section VI examines the relationship between this paper and the prior literature. Section VII concludes. Finally, the Appendix contains details regarding the derivation of the model's equilibrium.
I. Model

A. Players, Timing, Dynamics and Strategies
The Lanchester (1916) battle model was originally designed to study military strategy.
Since then variants have been widely used in the marketing literature to examine advertising strategies (see e.g., Erickson (1992); Erickson (1997); Fruchter and Kalish (1997) ; for a review, see Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long, and Sorger (2000) ). 7 Here it is adapted to produce a differential game within which to explore competition among duopolists over new innovations, and financing choices. 
where φ represents the speed with which consumers react to each firm's entreaties. Intuitively, Firms are assumed to be risk neutral profit maximizers: choosing spending to maximize their value. Instantaneous profits are assumed to be proportional to market share. Let α i denote the revenue generating ability of firm i per unit of market share. Profits π equal revenues minus both spending on market share competition and a fixed operating cost f i :
8 The model can be modified to include a stochastic dm. The results are unchanged since the firms are risk neutral profit maximizers. 9 In the marketing literature researchers tend to use as the law of motion either dm/dt = u 1 (1-m)-u 2 m or Dockner et al. (2000) ). One advantage of using (1) instead is that it is unit free. This makes it easier to take to the data. In addition, it eliminates the problem that if one changes the unit of currency then one also changes the rate at which m changes over time.
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( ) ( )
The term g represents the industry's rate of growth. It is assumed that as the industry grows larger profits and costs grow proportionately. Firm 1 is currently financially constrained and has secured financing sufficient only to finance the current equilibrium path.
To help streamline the exposition details regarding the derivation the model's equilibrium conditions, for a general version of the model, can be found in the Appendix. Each of the following sections then employs that general solution to discuss the interactions between firms and their financial structure in various special cases. Thus, in the main body of the paper equilibrium conditions are simply stated without proof except for occasional references back to the Appendix.
B. The Equilibrium Value Functions
Let r denote the instantaneous discount rate. Assume r>g and let δ=r-g. Assume neither firm ever exits. The Appendix shows that each firm's value function V i at time t (i.e., the present discounted value of each firm's profit stream conditional on the equilibrium strategies) can be written as:
and
within the scenarios considered in this paper. The terms a i and b i are functions of time and as shown in the Appendix equal:
where the constants C i and k i depend upon a particular problem's boundary value conditions (i.e., the value of the V i terms at some terminal date T).
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II. Full Information, Infinite Horizon Equilibrium
The simplest version of the model involves two firms that do not innovate, do not need outside financing, and compete over an infinite horizon. Since the game lasts forever the solutions to the model must be time independent. Thus, in equations (5) through (8) the C i and k i must all equal zero.
Since V i,m equals b i one can now plug equations (7) and (8) (with k i equal to zero) into (51) and (52) to find each firm's equilibrium spending on customer acquisition of:
and ( ) drops out of (11). In the long run it is irrelevant how long consumers take react to each firm's attempts to acquire market share so long as they react at all.
Returning to the paper's main objective one can write the explicit value functions for the current case as: Under this assumption competition eventually drives each firm's profitability back to pre new technology levels. However, markets experience real efficiency improvements via the adoption of the innovation.
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The financing decision (public versus private) has important value implications. Public financing is cheaper than private financing (i.e., there is a private market discount). This is due to the smaller pool of investors in the private markets as well as the relative illiquidity of these markets. On the other hand, if Firm 1 decides to finance the project via a public offering, 12 We are assuming that the opportunity to innovate expires immediately if it is not taken public. This might be expected in actual product markets. For example, when technologies can be patented, a firm's decision to abandon a potential development may open opportunities for other firms to profit from development. For a model that assumes that the option to go public at a later date is valuable, see e.g., Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2005) . 13 It is easy to relax this assumption in our framework; however, we believe that 14 We assume that copying is costless. It might be more realistic to assume that the cost of copying is positive (though much less than S). As long as the copying cost is sufficiently small that Firm 2 finds it worthwhile to copy, results and intuition regarding Firm 1's innovation and financing decision are identical to the costless copying case. 
III. Value and Incentives to Innovate: Public Financing
To determine Firm 1's optimal decision rule one needs to compare its value under each of the three possible scenarios (i.e., do not innovate; innovate, finance publicly; innovate, finance privately). As usual, the solutions to each game are obtained by working backwards from the date in time when both firms successfully adopt the innovation. (2006): 1 had a product at the market stage; 5 had products in Phase 3 development; and 4 firms had products in Phase 2. Importantly, none of these IPO firms had products in Phase I development, pre-clinical testing or discovery. In our context, an important observation is that the industry has two large incumbents: Amgen and Genetech. Our model provides the testable implication that their relative dominance plays an important role in the going public decision.
While at time T 2 the steady state equations hold, prior to then one needs to solve the time dependent system based on the appropriate boundary value conditions. At date T 2 one knows that (12) and (13) 
)
Given the above boundary value conditions, one can solve for the constants C i and k i in (5) through (8) (see the Appendix for details) to yield the equilibrium value functions of: 
Note that, except for the second terms in each equation, the value functions are of the same form as in the infinite horizon base case. These additional terms can be interpreted as the "first mover advantage" and "second mover disadvantage." Importantly, the marginal value of market share (and the optimal control i u ) is time independent.
Finally, we solve backwards once more to obtain the value functions at t=0. 
for Firms 1 and 2 respectively.
While equations (17) and (18) The battle over today's instant messenger market is vintage Microsoft, whose strategy enemies call "the three E's" in a parody of the company's marketing mantra: Embrace a rival's technology, extend it to work best with Windows, and extinguish the competition.
Hu (2001) This is the kind of industry dynamics captured in the value functions (17) and (18). Initially, a
Microsoft rival creates an innovation at time T 0 that allows it to better capture market share. At time T 1 the innovation enters the firm's production function thus increasing s 1 . Eventually, though, Microsoft discovers a way to incorporate the innovation into its own product line at date T 2 which then increases s 2 and eliminates the innovator's competitive advantage. Compared to a single firm setting, where T 2 is effectively set to infinity, the above scenario can greatly reduce if not eliminate innovation's value to its discoverer.
Given the above intuition, equations (17) and (18) 
The analysis will return to equations (19) and (20) later on when it considers the case of simultaneous opportunities to innovate.
Notice that the solutions given by (17) and (18) 
The derivative of Firm 1's value function with respect to the magnitude of the competitive advantage during period T 1 to T 2 is thus:
This is clearly positive (as would be expected 
T
This is always greater than zero and implies that larger, more profitable firms (recall that the equilibrium size of Firm 1 is ( ) 
Equation (24) 16 The relationship between firm size and innovative activity has long been the subject of academic debate. See Kamien and Schwartz (1975) for a survey of early work (static models) and a discussion of the Schumpterian hypothesis that product market rivalry will impact innovation incentives. Acs and Audretsch (1987) 
The comparative static results are summarized in the table below. 
The impact of an increase in the innovator's profitability on the value of any innovation.
The impact of an increase in the rival's profitability on the value of any innovation.
Small firms.
An increase in the discount rate reduces the value of any innovation. disclosure is letting rivals know how lucrative the business is. Their main result is that private financing occurs when start-up costs are high and when there is a high probability of displacement by a superior rival; public financing occurs when the technology is not costly and when the probability of displacement is low. Our focus differs in that we study the financing choice in a model with dynamic competitive interactions and a finite interval over which a 21 competitive advantage can be maintained. We also explicitly examine the potential value implications of the existence of a strong rival for a growing firm in an industry with heterogeneous goods.
An advantage of the model developed here is that it can easily be fit to data that is readily available. Besides offering a potentially rich set of cross sectional predictions for future testing it also allows for the investigation of competitive dynamics along the equilibrium path. This too is well suited for real data. Because competition evolves through time one can use the model to make better use of the available panel datasets chronicling stock returns and corporate accounting statements. One possible mapping between the model's parameter values and variables available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT can be found in the Appendix's Table 5 .
IV. Private versus Public Financing
We now turn to a primary question underlying our analysis: given the competitive structure and new technology presented above, how (if at all) will the potential innovator finance the investment? In this case the value functions at time zero are analogous to those under public financing and given by equations (17) In concurrence with the empirical literature the model assumes that private financing is more costly than public financing (see e.g., Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
Clearly, a high cost of adopting the technology decreases incentives to innovate. After referring back to (21), inequality (26) also shows that incentives are increasing in both the time over which Firm 1 is able to enjoy a first mover advantage and the magnitude of the innovation ψ 2 . 
A. Comparative Statics: Private versus Public Financing
This section examines how the incentives to finance publicly vary with firm characteristics. As in Section III.A, let 
We are interested in the cross-sectional relationships among the available financing choices and firm characteristics. 
As shown in the Appendix, (29) is positive for all ψ 2 >ψ 1. Therefore, the incentive to secure private financing is increasing in Firm 1's revenue generating ability (α 1 ). Intuitively, this occurs because high α firms are in the best position to use any technological advance to aggressively pursue market share. Equation (29)'s prediction that the most lucrative projects should be financed privately is consistent with findings of operational underperformance of IPO firms in the years following issuance (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
The sign of equation (30) depends on the relative values of α 1 and α 2 . Incentives are decreasing in α 2 when α 2 > α 1 ψ/2, and increasing in α 2 when α 2 is small (i.e., α 2 < α 1 ψ/2). This is because profitable rivals (i.e., high α 2 ) will spend more aggressively during the period of Firm 1's first mover advantage, making it optimal for Firm 1 to spend aggressively during this period as well.
All else equal, in this range, increases in α 2 will decrease the value of extending the period of competitive advantage to Private 2 T through private financing. On the other hand, when α 2 is small, the benefits from a extending the period of first-mover advantage outweigh the costs of higher equilibrium spending. 
V. Extensions
The main model focuses on a particular type of innovation: one that provides Firm 1 with an opportunity for first mover profits. While we believe that this setting is most appropriate when considering a firm's incentive to secure financing for R&D investment, it is also the case that some technology shocks do not involve first mover opportunities. In fact, industry shocks are often characterized by common shifts in investment opportunities. This might occur, for example, if an upstream firm develops a low cost input to production that can be used after incurring a one time switching cost. It is also possible that firms face firm specific opportunities (innovations that cannot be copied). The structure of our basic model is sufficiently pliable to examine these possibilities. This section considers two extensions: the impact of industry wide and firm specific shocks on innovation and financing.
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A. Industry Wide Opportunity
Consider an innovation that appears at time zero in which both firms simultaneously have the opportunity to develop the technology 
Where:
V 1 and V 2 are the value functions defined in (12) and (13). (19) 
First and Second Mover Advantage are from Equations
Assume that S is sufficiently low that at least one firm will find innovation profitable. FirstMove Adv S i > ∈ ), both firms will choose to innovate. In that case, an IPO will occur; however (interestingly), it will accompany value decreases for both firms due to the initial required investment. This is due to the fact that both firms spend money on the innovation but, in the end, do not obtain a competitive advantage. As noted in the introduction results like these are very difficult to reproduce in a single firm model. In such models firms only take actions that increase their present value. However, the duopoly model makes clear that sometimes firms are forced to pick between options all of which result in a value reduction.
In line with the modeling assumptions used in Section III if just one of the firms chooses to innovate at date zero then the other can costlessly adopt the technology at dateT 2 . (It is easy to show that it is never optimal to adopt the technology between dates 0 and T 2 .) Therefore, each firm trades off the cost of developing the innovation with the second mover disadvantage. This setup gives some insight as to where and when innovation is most likely to occur (i.e., in larger, more profitable firms, when technology shocks are large).
While the simultaneous adoption of the technology by the two firms leads to a reduction 
where ∆V 1 (0) represents the change in the firm's value at date zero when the innovation's existence becomes known given just Firm 1 adopts it. As one expects, the greater the competitive advantage afforded by the innovation (ψ 1 ), the earlier it comes on line (T 1 ), and the longer until the second firm acquires it (T 2 ) the more likely it is that the firm sees a value increase upon the technology's announced existence (∆V 1 (0)>0). The more interesting comparative statics have to do with the second derivatives of ∆V 1 (0) (the influence of industry structure on the value of the innovation to the early adopter). But, with a single initial adopter these derivatives are identical to those found in Table 1 and thus are not repeated here.
One can also examine the case of an industry wide shock to a variable that does not impact strategic spending 
respectively for firms 1 and 2.
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As long as the innovation κ is large enough (i.e.,
, then both firms will innovate. As in the case above, private financing is ruled out since there is no competitive cost to transparency. Here, Firm 1's decision to undertake the IPO is associated with value increases for both firms. This is consistent with public equity issuance near high industry valuations but is again distinct from market timing explanations.
To summarize, the value implications of the industry wide shock examples depend on whether or not the shock involves a parameter in the optimal control function (e.g., a change in an important input price versus a new investment technology). Because there are no competitive costs associated with transparency industry wide innovations are financed publicly. Increase in a firm's ability to acquire market share.
Both firms decline in value upon adopting the innovation.
Both adopt at time zero.
Increase in a firm's ability to acquire market share.
Early adopter may see a rise in value. Late adopter sees an immediate decline in value. Ultimately both firms may see a value decline.
One firm adopts at time zero, the other at time T 2 .
Reduction in a firm's fixed operating costs.
Adopters see a value increase. All firms.
B. Firm Specific Opportunity in α i : Hear no Evil, See no Evil.
The analysis now turns to firm specific opportunities to innovate. In this case, Firm 1's new technology is inappropriate for use by Firm 2. If the innovation involves changes to s then the main model can easily be modified to handle the problem: simply let 2 T → ∞ in (27). Since changing either s 1 or s 2 alters the law of motion governing market share, Firm 2 can immediately deduce Firm 1's value of s by simply watching m change over any one instant. There can be no hidden information under this scenario.
While changes in s can be immediately deduced by either firm there exist other variables whose value a firm can potentially keep "hidden." One such variable is α; thus, this section of the paper concentrates on the case where Firm 1 has an opportunity to increase its value. As will be seen this case shows that private financing can act as an information shield that benefits both firms in the industry.
Assume that Firm 1 has an opportunity to immediately raise 1 α from 1,L α to 1,H α . The cost of the technology is S. As before, Firm 1 can finance the innovation publicly or privately.
If it is publicly financed, all information regarding fundamentals ( 1 α ) become common knowledge. If the technology is privately financed, Firm 1 can choose to "hide" and operate as though it were a low type firm (i.e., it pretends no innovation has occurred). At some finite time T, the true 1 α becomes common knowledge (e.g., through taxes or some other public signal revealed to the market). If the high type deviates from the pooling equilibrium before T the firms return to the full information game. An interesting aspect of the pooling equilibrium, as will be shown, is that Firm 2 often prefers to be uninformed. (Hence, the section's title.) This is because lack of information about Firm 1's marginal value of market share commits Firm 2 to less aggressive product market behavior.
21
Before solving for the conditions under which Firm 1 "hides," it is useful to point out that the potential incentive to hide comes from the fact that optimal spending (
The high type firm would like to credibly commit to spend less on gaining market share (as long as Firm 2 also does so), but cannot do this when there is full information. However, if the conditions for a pooling equilibrium exist then the lack of complete information can make, in equilibrium, lower spending individually rational.
In this example (for simplicity) hold spending effectiveness constant across firms (s 1 =s 2 =1) and set the consumer responsiveness parameter (φ) to one. In a pooling equilibrium the "high type" firm chooses private financing to avoid having to reveal so much information to the market that Firm 2 becomes aware of the change in α 1 . Firm 1 can then continue to hide its new status by spending less on obtaining market share. Pooling will be profitable if the gains from keeping u i low outweigh the opportunity cost of a more aggressive campaign. Naturally, the cost is that Firm 1's market share increases at a slower rate. There are two relevant time periods:
(1) t=0 when, if the investment is undertaken, 1,L α increases to 1,H α ; and (2) t=T, when the firms return to the full information game and play 1,
Consider now the value, 1 (0) V of Firm 1 when it decides to privately finance in order to hide its true revenue generating capacity. 22 It continues to do so through period T, at which point it is no longer possible to hide. Profits from pooling until T are given by:
Firm 1 chooses to "hide" as the low type if firm value from taking that strategy exceeds firm value when he reveals his true type:
.
22 Conditions will hold for t<T.
Parameters 1 1 and a b are identical to those in the full information game. To obtain the value of the right hand side of (37), note that pooling implies:
Therefore, Firm 1 chooses to hide when:
Rearranging and substituting for 1 1 and a b , given by (5) and (7) with C 1 =k 1 =0 gives the conditions for pooling in this example:
Inequality (40) u derived in the full information game.
In the pooling equilibrium Firm 1 sometimes want to "hide," but Firm 2 prefers this equilibrium as well. In fact, the range of parameters over which Firm 2 prefers pooling is even larger than the range over which Firm 1 chooses to pool. This is because pooling by Firm 1 allows Firm 2 to maintain a larger market share while spending less money.
To prove that if Firm 1 pools then Firm 2 prefers to remain ignorant repeat the same process that led to (40), but now solve for the conditions under which Firm 2 prefers pooling:
Again, the parameters 2 2 and a b take on the same value as they do in the full information game.
To obtain the value of the right hand side, note that pooling implies:
Therefore, Firm 2 prefers for Firm 1 to remain private and hide when:
This in turn implies that:
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The rival firm is able to spend less to obtain market share under pooling, and (44) holds for all 2 α >0.
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Given U.S. regulations regarding disclosure for public firms, it can be very difficult for them to withhold information from rivals while complying with the requirement that they keep investors informed. The results in this example show that private financing may provide a mechanism through which firms can commit to less aggressive spending. The intuition behind this result can be compared to the capacity pre-commitment in Gelman and Salop (1983) in that by pre-committing (via private financing) to withhold information, an equilibrium outcome is one in which both firms spend less on market share gains. It is also analogous to the "Fat Cat
Effect" in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) in that spending on market share is a strategic complement and private financing provides a commitment device for less aggressive behavior.
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VI. Relationship to the Prior Literature
IPO activity has been extensively studied in both the theoretical and empirical literature. In their survey paper, Ritter and Welch (2002) provide several reasons for IPOs, including a role for product market competition (such as gaining a first-mover advantage via being the first firm in an industry to have an IPO). Our paper adds to this general literature by bring attention to the possibility that dynamic interactions between firms competing within a single industry might influence when and if a firm goes public. This is, of course, not the first paper to posit a relationship between the product and financial markets. However, the previous literature has tended to focus on the strategic use of 25 When 1,L α = 1,H α , Equation (44) = 0. The partial derivative of the right-hand-side of (44) Spulber (1995) also shows how, in Bertrand competition, not knowing rivals' costs implies equilibrium prices that are above marginal costs (i.e., information asymmetry softens product market competition). debt in a firms' capital structure to obtain a competitive advantage. This happens because the debt distorts the firm's incentives away from future profit maximization. In an attempt to exploit the then outstanding debt firms may behave more aggressively leading them to generate higher profits. Although, in equilibrium these profits are often not realized as every firm in the industry takes out debt. In the end, industry profits can actually be lower than if firms were unable to lever up at all. Examples along these lines include Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988) , and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) (further details, examples, and discussion can be found in the survey by Maksimovic (1990) ). On the empirical side of the literature, Chevalier (1995) provides evidence on the interaction between leverage and corporate behavior based on a sample of supermarkets following LBOs. Her analysis suggests that, contrary to the limited liability effect of debt effect that is predicted by much of the theoretical literature (e.g., Brander and Lewis (1986); Maksimovic (1988) ), that instead debt "softens" product market competition.
In contrast to this literature our paper's focus has been on the public-private decision rather than the leverage decision.
With the exception of Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) in the theoretical literature and recent empirical work by Chemmanur, He and Nandy (2006) , little has been done to improve our understanding of the potential strategic role played by the private versus public financing decision. Given the size of the private equity (and debt) markets it is important to identify the factors that encourage a firm to use this source of financing rather than the public markets. 
VII. Conclusions
The paper's main goal has been to answer the following questions: First, what are the characteristics of firms that benefit most from innovation and from private financing? Second, how important are industry structure, rival characteristics, and the nature of the innovation? In the context of a dynamic duopoly, we provide closed form solutions for the values of two competing firms, in a setting in which one firm faces an opportunity to innovate. If the technology is adopted, the firm must also determine whether it will obtain public or private financing. Our results relate current firm and industry characteristics to these decision variables.
In particular, larger, more profitable firms with small rivals have the greatest incentives to innovate. The private versus public financing decision depends mainly on the magnitude of the technological improvement and length of the period during which private financing extends the innovator's product market advantage. The results from our model suggest that future empirical work examining financing patterns should also explicitly consider competitive dynamics.
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IX. Appendix
A. The General Model and its Solution
This appendix contains the solution to the most general version of the model discussed in this paper. For the problem described in Section I the value functions for the firms at time 0 are:
and 2 2 2 2 2 0
respectively. Here T is a terminal date on which the game ends, and B i the present value of each firm's terminal value. Note, because the game ends at date T the value functions (V i ) depend both on m and the time remaining until date T.
Following standard practice in the literature on differential games the analysis seeks a Nash equilibrium in which the players use Markovian strategies (see Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long, and Sorger (2000) ). For each firm the instantaneous value functions given by (2) imply that in a Markovian Nash equilibrium the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations must hold: 
Equations (49) and (50) u into the HJB equations (47) and (48) yield the two differential equations (after some extensive algebra): 
that need to be solved.
The solutions for the value functions in (53) and (54) are determined by guessing and verifying that they take on the time dependent forms given by (3) and (4) at any date t. Those functional forms then imply that the derivatives with respect to m and t of the value functions equal: Plugging equations (55) and (56) into (53) and (54) 
Solving these last two equations for b i produces equations (7) and (8).
Given equations (5) through (8) a particular problem's boundary conditions then determine the C i and k i terms and thus provide a full characterization of the economy's equilibrium behavior. The main body of the text presents various scenarios, their boundary value conditions, and the solutions they impose on the C i and k i terms. There can also be found the paper's analysis of the economy's overall behavior.
Time Independent Case
In the time independent case the values a i and b i do not depend on t. Simple inspection of (5) through (8) then implies that the C i and k i terms must equal zero.
Time Dependent Case: Value Functions for t∈[T 1 , T 2 )
The solutions for the b i given by (57), and (58) subject to the boundary value condition (14) can be found by inspection. Simply note that if the k i terms equal zero then at date T 2 the b i terms will satisfy (14).
To solve for the a i terms one needs find C i such that 
and )) ( 
To sign this, note that at ψ 1 =ψ 2 , (29) equals 0. Since 
